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Union presence has a complex effect on absenteeism, a tudy find

Controlling absenteeism: Union and nonunion differences

Steve Markham and Dow Scott

lthough ab enteeism has
bee n at its lowest level in
several decade , the curre nt
economjc recovery fore hadow an
increase in ab enteeism as the fear
of job loss lessens among e mployees. This growth in absenteeism
will represent a sub tantial co t to
business ( ee teers & Rhodes,
1978). In anticipation of this problem, managers should again turn
their attention to this concern.

A

One of the traditional "barriers"
to the imple mentation of new
employee programs and policies
has been unjons. Despite the belief
that union presence is thought Lo be
associated with high level of
absenteeism, comparatively little
research has examined the relationship of unions and absenteeis m.
Because of the importance of the
labor movement in the American
economy and the common
managerial belief that unions increase labor co ts by restricting
management's Oex.ibility, this
research examines unfons' effects
on ab e nteeism and attendance
control methods.

The lite rature
Based on the ir considerable e fforts

lo maintain a union-free status,
managers apparently agree
that important difference exist between unionized and nonunionized
organizations, and that the latter is
definitely preferable. These differences are often referred to in
books (usually in terms of how to
remain union-free) and in management seminars. One of the underlying concerns is a difference articulated by Beavers (1976) in the
ASPA Handbood of Personnel and
Industrial Relations:
onunion organizations are quite

different from unionized
organizations. in wruch-despite
euphemistic statements to the
contrary-the relationship bel\veen e mployees and management may be that of adversaries.
(Beavers. 1976: 7 /55)
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Based on these assumed differences, Foulkes (1980) conducted a study that compared personnel policies and practices of
large nonunion companies to tho e
of large union companies in the
United States . Foulkes reported
that personnel policies are sub lantially different in unionized and
nonunionized organizations in
Personnel Administrator/FEBRUARY 1985

87

terms of employment security, promotion, personnel development activities and feedback/complaint procedures. Freeman and Medoff
(1979; l 98 l ) examined the question of union effects by conducting
an exhaustive review of the empirical literature that examined this
controversy. They concluded that
collective bargaining has significant
impacts on wage rates and personnel policies. Organizations with
unions seem to have more rules
and more rigidity in the scheduling
of hours.
Although a consensus seems Lo
exist among managers concerning
the adverse impact of collective
bargaining, conflicting theories and
mixed empirical results have cast
doubt on the accuracy of this belief
with respect to absenteeism. On
one hand, Freeman (1976) suggests that because unions focus attention on workplace problems and
encourage expression of discontent,
unionized employees will say that
they are more dissatisfied with their
jobs than nonunionized employees.
To the extent that job satisfaction is
linked to absenteeisrri (see Porter
and Steers, 1973), organizations
with unions might be expected to
have higher absenteeism rates.
Henle (1974) also hypothesizes that
absenteeism is ~igher in unionized
and governmental organizations
because unions are more likely to
obtain extensive paid-absence programs &om management. Leigh
(19&1) examined both wage effects
and sick leave benefit effects on
absence due to illness for union
and nonunion employees. His
recursive model showed that sick
leave benefits resulted in higher
absence rates among union
members despite the monopoly
wage.
Alternatively, Stoikov and
Raimon (1968) argued that the
more effective systems of industrial
j l.U'.isprudence associated with
88

unions results in greater employee
job satisfaction. If the integrity of
the grievance system is
maintained- and this is dependent
on bona fide trade union
representation-Stoikov and
flaimon expect job satisfaction to
be higher among unionized
e mployees. Thus, if the Porter and
Steers (1973) argument is correct,
the presence of a union should
result in lower a bsenteeism.
A third Cllternative provided by
Allen (l 98lb) suggests that the
presence of a union does not have
a uniform effect on absenteeism.
Alle n (l 98lb) contends that
a bsenteeism is the result of an
e mployee's labor/leisure decision
after taking into ac~u nt the constraints imposed by the employer
and by peer pressure. Absenteeism
is higher where the union
negotiates a paid absence program,
provides more job security by
reducing management's ability to
discipline employees and bargains
for linking pay increases to seniority
rather than performance. However,
Allen (1981 b) also notes that the
presence of a union might be
associated with a lower absenteeism
rate because e mployees with good
absence records do not want to
support c pronic absentees, and the
union exerts pressure to weed them
out. Thus, the general effect of
unions on absenteeism is a mbiguous, and depe nds on the
union's relationship with manageme nt. Alle n's research (198 l a;
l 98l b) reflects this ambiguity. In
the first study he found higher
a bsenteeism to be associated with
unions, but did not find that relationship in the second study.
In addition to conilicting theories
and research, the literature on
unions and absenteeism seems to
have overlooked a very important
moderating variable, i.e., the effect
of right-to-work laws. As a n atte mpt
to curb the power of unions, Sec-
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tion 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act
(19 4 7) was passed to allow states to
enact legislation prohibiting compulsory union me mbership as a
condition of e mployment. Since the
passage of this act, 20 states have
enacted such legislation. The major
investments which e mployers and
unions have made in contesting
right-to-work laws attest to the belief
that this legislation has a significant
impact on the power of unions. The
basic managerial argume nt for
these laws is that existe nce of rightto-work laws disrupts the monopoly
power of the union to coerce (at
minimum) financial support and (in
practice) membership. To the extent that its recruiting power is
limited, the union is forced to attract me mbers by other means.
Thus, in right-to-work states,
management expects that union
relations will be more cooperative
and less antagonistic than in states
without right-to-work laws.
However, research has also produced mixed findings with respect
to this belief. Even though
Lumsden and Petersen (1975)
found that states with right-to-work
laws had a significantJy smaller
percentage of their work force
unionized, they attributed the differe nce to the tastes and preferences of the labor forces in these
areas. As a result, they concluded
that the battle over state right-towork laws is symbolic rather than
substantive. A.T. Kearney, Inc. also
found that the success of unions in
winning representation elections
was not influenced by right-to-work
laws (Curre nt Developments,
1981). In contrast, Moore and
Newman (1975) found that union
membership was slightly lower in
states with right-to-work legislation.
Wessels (198 1) reported that the
effects of right-to-work laws appeared to have little, if any, effect
on union membership, union problems or wages. However, he did
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find a significant positive relationship with job satisfaction for nonunion workers.

Methodology
To determine if the commonly held
management assumption that
unjonized organizations have more
problems with ab enteeism than
nonunion firms, five research que lions were inve ligated:

1. Is the presence of a union
associated with higher absenteeism
rates?
2. Are there major differences
between union and nonunion
organizations in their approaches to
controlling absenteeism?

3. Do unfon organizations have
more formally developed attendance control policies than nonunion organization ?

4. Is the presence of a union
associated with a paid absence
program?
5. Do difference between rightto-work states and non-right-to-work
states affect the influence that union
presence has on absence rates and
absenteeism control policies?
Five thousand personnel
managers from across the United
States were drawn from the rolls of
the American Society for Personnel
Administration. The sample was
drawn randomly with respect to
size, industry and union representation. The return rate was approximately 20 percent (N = 959), of
which 62 percent were nonunion
and 38 percent were union. A
comple te discussion of the sample
demographics can be found in Scott
& Markham (1982).
A four page mail-out survey asked respondents to indicate which of
34 methods of attendance control
programs they used. (These
methods are listed in Figure 1.)
The survey asked for demographic
information about the organization,
90

1

including the absence rate. (Thus,
the level of analysis for this project
is autonomous plants or divisions,
not individual employees.)
For each method of control listed
in the survey, respondents were
asked first if their companies or
agencies currently used this technique. If they replied affirmatively,
an additional piece of information
was requested: How effective has
this method been in controlling
absenteeism? Four choices were
provided for rating the effectiveness
of a method: (1) not effective at all;
(2) marginally ineffective, the
benefits just below the costs; (3)
marginally effective, the benefits
barely worth the costs; and (4)
definitely effective, successful.

Results
Question 1. Union/nonunion differences in absenteeism rates. In
response to the first research que tion, " ls the presence of a union
associated with higher absenteeism
rates?", average absence rates for
union and nonunion firms were
compared. The average absenteeism rate for the nonunion firms was
4.2 percent (s.d. = 3. 9), and
union firms had an average absenteeism rate of 4.5 percent (s.d. =
3.5). Given sampling fluctuation ,
there is no Latistically significant
difference between these two rates.
It appears, therefore, that the
presence of a union is not
associated with higher absenteeism
rates in this sample.

Question 2. Differences in control metlwds. The second research
question asks if there are major differences between union and nonunion organizations in the methods
used to control absenteeism. In the
first column of Figure 1, the 34
absenteeism control methods are
ranked by their frequency of use in
nonunion settings. The rated effectiveness of each technique is listed
in the second column. The third
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column repeats the frequency information for organizations that have
unions. The fourth column shows
the rated effectiveness for unionized organizations. When comparing
the frequency of program use for
union and nonunion organizations,
a difference of 12 percent or more
between the two columns of frequency data for nonunion and
union sites is significant at
p < .001 if a test for differences
between independent proportion is
applied. (See Glass and Stanley
[1970) for computational details.)
Overall, there is a high degree of
similarity between the percentage
of union and nonunion firms that
use each control method. This is
especially true for the first four
methods listed. For example, the
most frequent1y used method for
both group is "employee call-in to
give notice of absence" which is
used by 99 percent of the organizations in both categories.
Of the 34 methods listed in
Figure 1, the frequencies of use of
nine techniques differs by more
than 12 percent. These nine programs can be subdivided into two
categories: Those used more frequently by union firms and those
used more frequently by nonunion
firms.
The programs which are used
more frequently by union firms include the following: (1) requiring a
written doctor's excuse for illness
and accidents (71 percent of the
nonunion firms require this, as opposed to 89 percent of the union
firms); (2) analysis of daily attendance information at least monthly
(used by 50 percent of nonunion
firms and 68 percent of union
firms); (3) improvements of safety
on the job (used by 48 percent of
nonunion firms and 70 percent of
union firms); (4) wiping clean a
problem employee's record by
subsequent good attendance (used
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by 41 percent of nonunion firms
and 55 percent of union firms); (5)
supervisory training in attendance
control (used by 34 percent of

nonunion firms and 48 percent of
union firms); (6) formal work safety
training programs (used by 34 percent of nonunion firms and 55 per-

cent of union firms); and (7)
substance abuse programs (used by
22 percent of nonunion firms and
37 percent of union firms).
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Those programs used more frequently by nonunion firms include
the following: (1) inclusions of
absenteeism rates on employee job

performance appraisal (used by 77
percent of nonunion firms and 4 7
percent of union firms); and (2)
flexible work schedules (used by 26

percent of nonunion firms and 12
percent of union firms).
Neither nonunion nor uninn firms
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seem to be innovators with respect
to new types of absence control
programs. As opposed to the high
levels of use reported by both
union and nonunion sites for traditional programs such as e mployee
call-in, termination and progressive
discipline, newer methods which
have been praised in personnel
literature are used very infreque ntly. Examples of these programs
which are used in less than two
percent of either type of firm include operation of a day care
center, use of random/lottery
reward systems, and charting biorhythms.

1n light of the increasing
economic pressure for higher productivity, one might expect that attendance control would be a high
management priority. One item
from Figure l indicates the amount
of concern that management has
given to the problem of absenteeism in union sites. Item 34, which
applies only to unionized firms,
asks if the absenteeism control
policy has been negotiated into the
union contract. Thirty-eight percent
of the firms reported that absenteeism control was subject to negotiation. Although arbitrators typically
futd that management has the right
to unilaterally establish attendance
control policies and programs (T.
Whyte v. Aro, Inc., 47 LA 1065;
Abex Corp. vs. Wagner, 52 LA 484),
this item could be of much greater
importance in future labor contracts
given the competitive pressur es of
the 1980s.
Another way of looking at the second research question is to compare the actual ab e nteeism rates
between users and nonusers of a
specific program for both union
and nonunion organizations. This
information is provided in Figure 2.
The data suggest a dramatic difference in the actual effective ness
of the various control methods for
96

union versus nonunion organizations. For example, there is only
one method (monthly analysis of attendance data) that, when used by
organizations with unions, results in
significantly lower absenteeism. In
fact, in examining Columns 3 and
4 , there are two methods (requiring
peers to fill in for absent e mployees
and the negotiations of attendance
policies in the union contract) that
have a paradoxical effect. That is,
companies reporting the use of
these methods actually have higher
..ates of absenteeism.
The situation for the nonunion
companies, however, is very different. In Columns 2 and 3, there
are six methods that, when u ed,
are associated with significantly
lqwer levels of absenteeism. These
six include: (1) a consistently applied policy; (2) screening of
recruits' past attendance record ;
(3) daily attendance record maintained by the personnel department; (4) public recognition of
employee good attendance; (5)
substance abuse programs; and (6)
perfect/good attendance banquets.
There was one method of attendance control that had an opposite
effect: Significantly higher rates of
absenteeism are associated with
supervisors having responsibility for
maintaining the daily attendance
records. On the whole, it appears
that the presence of a union has an
important effect on whether or not
various attendance control method
are effective in reducing absentee1Sm.

Questwn 3. Differences in program formality. lf unions see their

role as protecting the intere ts of
their members, one method of accomplishing this purpo e is through
more rational, formalistic employee
relations. One indication of more
formalistic e mployee relations could
be the choice and number of atte ndance control policies.
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In order to investigate this question, an index of absenteeism control methods-in-use was constructed
from the 34 methods listed in
Figure 2. Each method was considered to be an example of a formal attendance control program. A
composite score for each firm was
computed by totaling the numbe r of
programs that were currently being
used by a respondent. Organizations which did not have a union
had significantly fewer control
techniques (13.8) than organizations which did (average = 15.2
control techniques). This indicates a
more formal approach to the attendance problem in unionized firms.
Supporting this conclusion was the
fact that a high percentage of union
firms were able to report their
absenteeism rates (78 percent)
compared to nonunion firms (64
percent). Despite the fact that union
sites had a greater number of control programs on average, the actual number of programs was not
significantly correlated with absence
rate (r = - .05; n.s.)
In a post-hoc analysis of Question
3, these data were reexamined
by categorizing major absence control methods as either positive
reward approaches or negative disciplinary approaches. The reward
approach included the following: A
paid absence bank (Item 28), flexitime work schedules (Item 20),
monetary bonus for perfect attendance (Item 23), a good attendance
record banquet {Ite m 29), public
recognition of employees with good
attendance records (Item 21) and
job enrichme nt or e nlarge ment
(Item 26). The disciplinary technique included progressive discipline programs (Item 3), a conistently applied policy (Item 6), a
clearly written policy (Item 7), an
explanation to new hires of absenteeism policies in the orientation
program (Item 9), the identification
and discipline of abusers (Item 4)
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and monthly analy i of daily attendance information (Item 12). Two
scales, Reward Methods and Discipline Method , were created by
totaling the number of each that an
organization used. Union firms
have a great number of disciplinary
control methods than nonunion
firms (F ratio = 23.5, p<.0001);
whereas the rever e was true for
the reward tC'chniqucs. onunion
organizations had a significantly
higher number of reward methods
than union organizations (F ralio =
2 1.5, p<.0001).
Interestingly, fu·ms with unions
which have negotiated an attendance policy have a more formal
program than union firm that have
not negotiated their policy. The correlation between the number of

programs used by a unionized firm
and whelher or not attendance
policy is part of the union contract
negotiations is r = .20 (p <..0002).

Question 4: Differences in hourly
paid-absence programs. Paid
absence programs have received
special attention in the literature
because such programs make
absences less costly to e mployees,
thus increasing their propensity to
be absent (Allen, 198lb; Leigh,
1981). Furthermore, a paid absence program makes individual incide nts of absenteeism more costly
to the organization. Thus, the
fourth research question asks if the
presence of a union is as ociated
with a paid hourly ab ence program. The data for this question
are displayed in Figure 3.

Of the 375 nonunion organizations in this sample that reported
their absenteeism rates, 63 percent
had a paid absence program for
hourly workers. Only 32 percent of
the 235 union firms had a paid
absence program for hourly employee . Apparently the presence of
a union does not guarantee that a
paid-absence program will exist in a
firm. In fact, management seems to
be more likely to give employees a
paid absence program if a union
does not exist.
The bottom half of Figure 3 indicates that significant differences
in absenteeism rates do not exist
between union and nonunion firms,
between firms with and without a n
hourly paid-absence program and
between firms with a combination
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of the two conditions. It does not
appear that the presence of a paidabsence program has an appreciable effect on the absence
rates of the firms reported in this
sample.

Question 5: The effects of right-towork /,aws. One alternative explanation for the lack of positive results
presented in Figure 3 might be that
all union environme nts are not the
same. One pote ntially powerful environme ntal condition for unions
may be the right-to-work laws.
In Figtu-e 4 , this sample has been
dichotomized into those organizations that have state right-to-work
laws and those that do not. The left
half of the table shows that the
absence rate for the 465 organizations in states without right-to-work
laws was 4.34 percent. The absence rates for organizations with
and without unions and for organizations with and without paid
absence programs for hourly
workers are shown along with the
corresponding statistical test. The
diffe rence between union and nonunion absence rates i.s significantly
different (4.64 percent and 4.04
percent, respectively). This difference co1Tesponds to the traditional managerial belief about the
effects of unions on absenteeism.
However, differences between
absenteeism rates of union and
nonunion organizations located in
slates that do have right-to-work
laws are rwt significantly differenl.
(See the right side of Figure 4.)
It appears that right-to-work laws
are an important condition in
understanding the relationship of
union presence and a bsenteeism.
In states with right-to-work laws,
evidence supporting managers'
beliefs linking unions with higher
rates of absence could not be
found. When organizations from
right-lo-work states were removed
from the rest of the sample, the ex100

peeled negative relationship between union presence and a high
absence rate was revealed. Thus,
apparently conflicting results in the
literature with respect to the question of union presence and absence
(e.g., Allen, l 98la; l 98lb) might
be resolved by holding constant the
effects of conditions found in states
that have right-lo-work laws.
To further illustrate the effect of
right-to-work legislation, note that
the organizations in states without
such laws (see Figure 4) which had
both a union and a paid-absence
program had the highest average
absence rate (5. 14 percent) in the
matrix. This result fits the common
management expectation about the
detrime ntal effects of unions a nd
paid-absence programs on
absenteeism. This compares with
the same type of organization (i.e.,
union presence with paid absence
program) in the right-to-work states
that had the lowest average absence
rate (3. 71 percent) in the matrix.

Conclusions
The common management assumption that the presence of a union is
necessarily associated with higher
absenteeism was not supported by
our initial results. However, the
presence of unions in general did
have an important consequence on
the effectiveness of specific control
policies. Quite simply, only one of
the 34 programs in union sites
resulted in a significantly lower
absence rate when used. In nonunion sites, six of the 34 programs
were associated with lower
a bsenteeism.
Whe n differences between rightto-work states and non-right-to-work
states were examined, the effect of
unions on absence rates was
markedly different. In right-to-work
states, there was no statistically
significant differe nce between union
and nonunion absence rates. In
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states without right-to-work legislation, there was a marked difference
between union and nonunion firms'
absence rates. These data suggest
that the right-to-work laws might be
a significant e nvironmental condition for understanding the influe nce
of unions on absenteeism. These
data also suggest an alternative explanation for the previous ambiguous findings in the literature
with respect to unions and
absenteeism rates.
H enle's (1974) contention that
unionized organizations would be
more likely to have a paid absence
program received no supp011 from
these data. In fact, there was a
negative relationship between the
presence of a union and the
presence of a paid absence program for hourly workers. Stoikov
and Raimon's (1968) argument
that a union might increase
employee satisfaction, the re by
reducing absenteeism, did not appear to be supported either. Allen's
(198 1 b) prediction that unions may
influence absenteeism in both
directions, thus masking the effect
of unions on absenteeism, was not
contradicted; however, the
moderating effects of the conditions
in states that have right-to-work
laws seem to constitute a more potent variable for explaining any diffe1·ential union effects on
absenteeism rates.
The evidence presented here
does show that there are some differences between union and nonunion organizations in the policies
and programs used to control
absenteeism. For example, union
fu-ms are more likely to have safety
programs, absenteeism data on
record and programs for wiping
clean an e mployee's past absence
record. They also have a greater
number of formal programs for
absence control and more discipline-oriented techniques such as

documenting absences with a doctor's note. Nonunion organizations
appear to have more flexibility in
scheduling, as evidenced by the
higher proportion of sites that have
flex.i-time and reward-oriented programs. Finally, the presence of a
union was not associated with a
greater likelihood of having a paid-

absence program; rather, a negative
relationship existed .

In summary, it appears that
unions have an important effect on
absenteeism, although the relationship is neither as simple nor as
straightforward as proposed in the
literatures. 0

Editor's Note: This article is based
on a study funded &y the ASPA
Foundatwn. The initial result.s of
that study &y Scott and Markham
appeared in " Absence control
methods: A survey of practices and
results" (June 1982). This artide
resulted from many requests received
&y the authors to reformat the data
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in a unwnlnonunion analysis.
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